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In 1943, Paul Rosenstein-Rodan first coined the term “big-push” in his paper about growth in 
Eastern European economies. In 1989, Murphy et al. characterised the big-push as a static multi-
equilibrium aggregate demand spillover model. Based on the model with a factory wage 
premium by Murphy et al. (1989), I have developed a simple multi-period dynamic model of 
big-push with a dynamic state variable powered by the aggregate spillover demand, where the 
economic growth is driven by two key parameters: wage premium and productivity. Armed with 
this economic growth model, I explore the dynamic behaviour and establish the economic 
characteristics of disequilibrium growth, which are common observable economic phenomena in 
the emerging economies. This model provides a simple but cogent economic structure, which 
may be used to explain and study economic phenomena such as the stagnation of the Japanese 
economy in 1990s and financial crises. In addition, this model offers plausible explanations for 
the empirical deviations of the Kuznets Curve and the Okun’s Law as identified in the recent 
literature. The significant implication of this model for the Okun’s Law and the Kuznets Curve 
in particular, and on economic theories in general, is that the economic relationships may not be 
static but dynamic and contingent on the state of an economy, which is determined by the ratio 
of wage premium on productivity and the industrialization state. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Based on the theory of big-push, Murphy et al. (1989) used the “no-industrialization trap” in a 
static multi-equilibrium model to explain why some countries remain unindustrialized and poor 
while some countries have successfully industrialized and grew rich. Nevertheless, the 
underdeveloped countries can break away from the “no-industrialization trap” and make a big 
push into industrialization by coordinating investments across industry sectors. 
 
Have any of the underdeveloped countries which are in the “no-industrialization trap” attempted 
big-push? What are the economic characteristics of a big-push process? Is the “East Asian 
Miracle” (World Bank 1993) an outcome of a big-push process? Will big-push introduce 
fragility into the emerging economies which, as a result, are more susceptible to a financial 
crisis? 
 
Based on the model with a factory wage premium by Murphy et al. (1989) and dismissed the 
myth of big-push that it is a “big-bang” or self-fulling theory, I have developed a simple dynamic 
model of big-push with a industrialization state variable powered by aggregate spillover demand 
where the economic growth is driven by two key parameters: wage premium and productivity. 
Using this simple economic growth model, I explore the dynamic behaviour and establish the 
economic characteristics of disequilibrium growth.  This dynamic model also provides a simple 
economic structure that can be used to study economic phenomena such as the stagnation of 
Japanese economy in the 1990s and financial crises. In addition, this model may have significant 
implication for the Okun’s Law and the Kuznets Curve in particular, and on the economic 
theories in general, that economic relationships may not be static but dynamic and contingent on 
the state of an economy, which is determined by the ratio of wage premium on productivity and 
the industrialization state. 
 
In the remaining of this section, I briefly introduce the theory of big-push (Rosenstein-Rodan, 
1943) and the static models of big-push developed by Murphy et al. (1989). In Section 2, I put 
forward the concept of the dynamic path of big-push and the two possible ways of initiating a 
big-push.  Section 3 presents the construction of the simple dynamic model of big-push. The 
intrinsic and economic characteristics of the model, which are contingent on the ratio of wage 
premium on productivity and the industrialization state of an economy, are established in Section 
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4. Section 5 examines the implications of this model for the stagnation of Japanese economy in 
1990s, the Okun’s Law and the Kuznets Curve. Section 6 is the conclusion and propositions for 
future research. 
 
1.1  The Theory of Big-push 
Paul Rosenstein-Rodan (1943) first coined the term “big-push” in his paper about growth in 
Eastern European economies. The term “big-push” refers to the transitional output expansion 
that may occur in a less-developed economy when various manufacturing sectors expand output 
simultaneously, thereby increasing demand for each other’s products and shifting the economy to 
high production equilibrium. He introduced the idea of simultaneous expansion of various 
sectors of the economy and coordinated investments in order for a country to get out of the trap 
of no-industrialization. 
 
According to Rosenstein-Rodan, if various sectors of the economy adopt increasing returns 
technologies simultaneously, they can each create income that will become a source of demand 
for goods in other sectors, and so enlarge their markets and make industrialization profitable. 
With this idea that simultaneous industrialization of many sectors of the economy can be 
profitable even when no sector can break even industrializing alone, Murphy et al (1989) 
developed static models to study the conditions under which both a zero and full level of 
industrialization coexist. They modelled the big-push into industrialization as a move from a bad 
to a good equilibrium. 
 
1.2  Static Multi-equilibrium Model 
The essential feature of big-push models developed by Murphy et al (1989) is the existence of 
multiple equilibriums. The source of the multiplicity of equilibriums is the pecuniary 
externalities generated by imperfect competition with large fixed costs. An important component 
of industrialization for which pecuniary externalities can be crucial is investment in jointly used 
intermediate goods, such as infrastructure. In other words, the multiplicity of equilibriums is due 
to a coordination problem inherent in activities that require intermediate inputs. 
 
For the existence of multiple Pareto-ranked equilibriums, the economy must be capable of 
sustaining two alternative levels of industrialization. This means that industrialization must be 
individually unprofitable at a low aggregate level of industrialization but individually profitable 
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as long as a sufficient number of other sectors industrialize. In the other words, unprofitable 
industrialization must have spillover effects on other sectors that make industrialization in other 
sectors more profitable. When multiple equilibriums exist, the overall welfare will improve by 
moving the economy from a bad equilibrium to a good one. The government can coordinate 
investments across sectors and ensure that the industrial infrastructure of intermediate goods is 
put in place. Generally, the coordination is provided through formulation of government policy 
such as investment subsidies, a minimum wage policy, infrastructures construction etc. 
 
Murphy et al. presented three mechanisms for generating a big push. In the first 2 models, 
industrialization of one sector raises the demand for other manufactures directly and thus makes 
large-scale production in other sectors more attractive. In the railroad model, industrialization in 
one sector increases the size of the market for railroad services used by other sectors and thus 
renders the provision of these services more viable. 
 
In this paper, I develop a simple dynamic model of big-push based on the model with a factory 
wage premium: 
“To bring farm labourers to work in a factory, a farm has to pay them a wage 
premium. But unless the firm can generate enough sales to people other than its own 
workers, it will not be able to afford to pay higher wages. If this firm is the only one 
to start production, its sales might be too low for it to break even. In contrast, if 
firms producing different products all invest and expand production together, they 
can all sell their output to each other’s workers and so can afford to pay a wage 
premium and still break even.” (Murphy et al., 1989, p. 1010-1011). 
 
Industrialization in one sector can increase spending in other sectors by altering the composition 
of demand. It raises the demand because workers are paid wage premiums to entice them to work 
in industrial plants. Hence, even a firm losing money can benefit firms in other sectors because it 
raises labour income and hence demand for their products. 
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2. The  Concept 
 
In the literature, most of the multi-equilibrium models are static models and assume the 
transition from low to high equilibrium to be instantaneous and self-fulfilling. The big-push 
models by Murphy et al. (1989) are also static and self-fulfilling models. 
 
If the transition from the low to high equilibrium is not instantaneous, the economy must move 
along a dynamic path, which must be a series of transitional disequilibrium states, to reach the 
high equilibrium. In the simple dynamic model of big-push, the dynamic path is powered by the 
aggregate spillover demand which is driven by two key parameters: wage premium and 
productivity. In order to capture the essence of big-push, the dynamic path should have a trap 
mechanism which traps the economy at low equilibrium unless it is pushed onto the dynamic 
path to the high equilibrium. 
 
If the economy is not at low or high equilibrium, it must be at a transitional state along the 
dynamic path of disequilibrium, where it can either move up to reach the high equilibrium or fall 
back to the low equilibrium, depending on the economic environment at a particular state. Before 
attaining the high equilibrium, there is a possibility that the economy may collapse from the 
present transition stage to a lower transition stage and ultimately fall back to the low equilibrium, 
due to a failure in the coordination of investments. Since investments are usually financed 
through a combination of equity and debt, the investment fails when the firm cannot meet the 
committed debt repayment schedule as the sales revenue and profit suffer as a result of 
coordination failure, which prevents the expected spillover demand from happening. The 
cascading financial failures may result in what is called a financial crisis, where failure in one 
sector of the economy can transmit to the other sectors (contagion effect) and hence the collapse 
of the economy. An emerging economy is apparently more susceptible to a financial crisis 
because big-push can leave an emerging economy in a fragile and unstable transitional 
disequilibrium state. 
 
2.1  Economic Theory behind Dynamic Path 
In the big-push model with a factory wage premium (Murphy al et 1989), there exist two Pareto-
ranked equilibriums, as envisioned in the big-push literature. Figure 1 shows the demand and 
supply curves of a good produced by a firm. At the low equilibrium, the demand and supply are 
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at equilibrium where the demand curve DL meets the supply curve SL, as shown as the L point in 
Figure 1. The high equilibrium, as shown as the H point, is also at equilibrium where the demand 
curve DH meets the supply curve SH.  By moving from the low to high equilibrium, the output 




























In a model of a closed economy with no population growth, an increase in productivity is a 
necessary but not sufficient condition to lift the economy from low to high equilibrium. A firm in 
each sector will not invest because investment is individually unprofitable without the spillover 
demand from other sectors. As a result, the economy is trapped at the low equilibrium. On the 
other hand, an investment can be profitable if a firm from each sector invests simultaneously. By 
investing in new technology and paying its workers a wage premium, a firm increases its 
productivity and output, as shown by the shifting of supply curve from SL to SH. Due to an 
income effect which is stimulated by the extra wages earned, the demand increases, as shown by 
the shifting of demand curve from DL to DH to meet the supply curve SH at the point H.  
 
Apparently, the demand and supply are intertwined; one needs the other to exist first in order to 
move from L to H. An investment in the productivity increases the income of the workers, which 
in turn stimulates the demand for the extra output of other goods produced by other investments. 
This presents two ways for governments to stimulate the economy: 
2.1.1  Stimulate supply (path L-A1-A2-E1), for example by an investment subsidy; 
2.1.2  Stimulate demand (path L-B1-B2-E1), for example by a minimum wage policy. 
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2.1.1  Big Push by Stimulating Supply 
Taking advantage of a government investment subsidy, an entrepreneur Firm-M decides to 
industrialize and invest in new production technology. Due to the increase in productivity and 
the fact that investment is lumpy, the Firm-M’s supply curve shifts from SL to SH as shown in 
Figure 1. At the point A1 where DL meets SH, the Firm-M is not able to make a profit without the 
government subsidy. 
 
Investment is a venture with a time frame (eg. short-term or long-term investment) and the 
common investment plan has low sales forecasts for the initial periods and increased the sales 
forecasts at later periods. With the conventional wisdom that time is essential for sales and 
marketing campaigns to create product awareness and stimulate demand, the Firm-M forecasts 
and produces q1 which is lower than qH at full production capacity. This is represented by the 
shifting of supply curve SL to a transitory supply curve S1.  
 
Without a spillover demand, the Firm-M has to clear its output at the price PA2 where DL 
intersects with q1 at point A2. As the Firm-M pays its workers a wage premium for higher skill, 
this creates spillover demands for the complementary goods and hence shifts the demand curves 
of firms in other sectors from DL to D1. Faced with the spillover demand, a proportion of firms in 
other sectors may decide to invest in the new technology and shift their supply curves from SL to 
S1. 
 
As more firms industrialize, this shifts the demand curve of Firm-M from DL to D1 or most 
probably even higher demand at D2 where the Firm-M further shifts its transitory supply curve to 
S2. Following the same principle, the demand curve moves from D1 to D2 and eventually arrives 
at DH as more and more firms industrialize. The transitory supply curve shifts from S1 to S2 and 
eventually arrives at the supply curve SH. In summary, the economy moves from the low 
equilibrium point L to E1 and then to E2, and eventually reaches the high equilibrium at point H 
where the demand curve DH meets the supply curve SH. 
 
2.1.2  Big-push by Stimulating Demand 
With a minimum wage policy in one sector of the economy, the government indirectly raises the 
disposable income of the workers of that sector. Through the income effect, there is now a higher 
demand for the complementary goods in other sectors, as shown by the shifting of demand curve 
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in a northeast direction, from DL to D1. As the demand is now greater than the supply, the prices 
of goods may temporarily increase to PB1, at the point B1 where D1 intersects with qL. 
 
Responding to the spillover demand, an entrepreneur Firm-M may drop the price from PB1 to PB2 
while it increases its output form qL to qB2, where the D1 meets with SL at point B2. Due to 
competitive market in each sector, the price is arbitrated to remain at p, as the Firm-M does not 
want to lose sales to the competitive fringes. This drives the Firm-M to industrialize and invest in 
new technology, as shown by shifting the supply curve from SL to SH. At the price p, the Firm-M 
can now produce q1 at the point E1 where the demand curve D1 intersects with the transitory 
supply curve S1. 
 
Since the Firm-M pays its workers a wage premium to work in a new technological environment, 
this in turn raises the demand for the complementary goods of other sectors, by shifting their 
demand curves from D1 to D2. Following the same principle, as more and more firms 
industrialize, the economy moves from the low equilibrium at point L to high equilibrium at 
point H, where the demand curve DH meets the supply curve SH. 
 
2.2 Conclusion 
From the above two scenarios, the dynamic path is the zigzag path around the horizontal line at 
the price P from the low equilibrium at point to the high equilibrium at point H. 
 
3. The  Model 
 
Based on the aggregate demand spillover model with a factory wage premium as discussed in 
Section IV of Murphy et al. (1989), I construct a simple multi-period dynamic model of big-
push. This model assumes that there are N complementary sectors in the economy.
1 Each 
complementary sector produces a unique good and hence there are N types of goods which are 
complementary. This model assumes that all goods have the same price of unity.
2 In addition, all 
goods are assumed to be perishable and ruined at the next period.
3 
                                                 
1 N is the number of firms that produce complementary goods in an economy. Therefore N remains constant 
assuming there is no introduction of new or obsolete goods which can affect the complementarity. “Economic 
growth through introduction of new goods” can be developed as an extension to this model. 
2 For perfect coordination, the assumption that the prices of all goods are the same is necessary to ensure the 
consistency with the assumption that each sector has only one monopolist firm. For simplicity, the price is set to 
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In the economy, there are two types of firms in each sector. First, there is a competitive fringe of 
firms that converts one unit of labour input into one unit of output with constant return to scale 
(cottage) production. Second, there is a unique firm, referred to as a “monopolist” firm in 
Murphy et al. (1989), which alone has access to an increasing return to scale (IRS) technology. 
The monopolist firm can invest  units of labour in the new technology which allows each unit 
of labour to produce 
F
1 > α  units of output. Since there is only one monopolist firm in each 
sector, hence there are N monopolist firms in the economy.
4 
 
This model assumes that each firm is endowed with   units of labour, which is also the 
numeraire. Then the output of each firm is 
L
L Y = . At time t, where  , there are   
cottage-firms, where a cottage-firm is a monopolist firm which uses cottage production. 
Likewise, there are   technology-firms, where a technology-firm is a monopolist firm which 
industrializes and invests in new technology. This model assumes homogeneity for all cottage-
firms and technology-firms. In the economy, the aggregate number of monopolist firms is 
. For convenience, this group of N monopolist firms is known as a 
‘complementary-group-economy’ or simply a ‘group-economy’. Therefore, the fraction of 
industrialized monopolist firms at time   is: 
0 ≥ t t C N ,
t T N ,







, =     where  0 1 ≤ ≤ t n , 
 and hence,   and  N n N t t C ) 1 ( , − = N n N t i T = , . 
 
In this model,   characterises the level of industrialization at which economy has arrived at or 
simply the industrialization state of the economy. At time 
t n
0 = t , there is no firm industrialized 
and hence n . As the big-push process starts at  0 = 0 1 = t , the kick-start fraction of industrialized 
firms needs to be greater than zero,  , in order to launch the big-push process. As shown  0 1 > n
                                                                                                                                                             
unity. A different price for different type of goods implies that each sector may have different number of 
monopolistic firms for perfect coordination.  
3 This assumption avoids the complication of inventory holding and output adjustment, which will not affect the 
general characteristics of big-push except the cost of inventory holding. This is a reasonable assumption for a long 
timeframe industrialization model where the focus is on the economic characteristics at the aggregate level. 
4 This assumption is to ensure that there is only one firm industrialize in each sector for perfect coordination. In fact, 
perfect coordination can also be achieved with equal number of firms industrialized in each sector. For consistency, 
we also use the same assumption and terminology. 
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later in Section 3.12,   is a state variable which depends on the ratio of wage premium to 






A cottage-firm pays its workers a wage of unity,  . 1 = C w
v
 On the other hand, a technology-firm 
has to pay a wage premium  , in order to entice skilled workers to work in a factory which 
uses a new technology. Since prices of all goods are always kept at unity by assumption, 
therefore the wage rate of technology-firm is 
0 > v
wT + =1 . 
 
This model assumes homothetic
5 preferences and that each worker buys an equal quantity of 
goods produced by each firm or spends his entire income equally on the goods produced by each 
firm. When a particular goods produced by a firm is in short supply, the workers will save their 
incomes rather than buy goods produced by the other firms. 
 
Assuming that the monopolist firm maximizes its price-taking demand curve as given, it 
industrializes only if there is a profit at the price it charges. Since it loses all its sales to the fringe 
if it charges more, it only sells at the same price charged by the fringe, which is unity. In 
addition, this model assumes that the monopolist firm faces a unitary elastic demand curve and 
hence it would not want the price to be lower than unity.
6 
 
At time t , where  , a technology-firm borrows a loan,  1 1≥ t B (units of labour), which is also the 
cost of the new technology, to finance its investment. With an increase in productivity, the 
technology-firm starts producing α  units of output at the next period. Using the profit of each 
period, the technology-firm will make a periodic repayment of   until the loan is fully settled at 
time  , where  . Indirectly, all the equations derived for a technology-firm must have 
time subscript of  . Hence, the loan equals the present value of its repayments or profits 





















B    where r is the applicable interest rate. 
 
                                                 
5 In order to achieve perfect coordination, this assumption of homothetic preference ensures the consistency with the 
assumption of homogeneity of technology-firm and the assumption of only one monopolist firm in each sector.  
6 This assumption is to ensure that the dynamic path is a straight horizontal line at unit price without the transitory 
price adjustment. 
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3.1  Output and Labour Cost 
Until it invests in the new technology, a cottage-firm Ci, where 1 t C N i , ≤ ≤ , has a constant 
output for every period: 
L Y Y Ci t Ci = = ,   (1) 
Since a cottage-firm pays a constant wage,  1 = = C Ci w w  to its workers, the labour cost of a 
cottage-firm for each period, which is constant over time, is:   
    L L w W W Ci Ci t Ci = = = , (2) 
 
 
A technology-firm  , where 1 , employs an IRS technology which has a productivity 
gain of 
Ti t T N i , ≤ ≤
) 1 ( − α . Because it pays its workers a wage premium of  , a technology-firm can only 
afford to employ 
v
t ε L of workers, where  t ε  depends on its sales forecast,
7 in order to maintain its 
profitability. Thus,  t ε , which is also known as the ‘employment rate’ of technology-firm, is the 
ratio of number of employed workers on labour endowment (L). The jobless workers are not 
restricted to a particular firm and are free to seek employment in other firms. Therefore the 
output of a technology-firm at time   is:  t
  L Y t t Ti αε = ,   (3) 
 
As a monopolist firm is only willing to industrialize if its output increases, the employment rate 
of technology-firm must be greater than the inverse of productivity as shown below: 
  L L Y t t Ti > =αε ,  
1 / 1 ≤ < ∴ t ε α   
As the wage rate of technology-firm is  v w w T Ti + = = 1 , the labour cost of a technology firm is: 
  L v L w W t t Ti t Ti ε ε ) 1 ( , + = = .  (4) 
 
 
                                                 
7 The incorporation of a sales-forecasting model, such as the adaptive expectation model, will not affect the general 
characteristics of this model except the inaccuracy will slightly dampened the dynamic path of big-push, in 
comparison with the dynamic path at the optimal employment rate (prefect forecasting). 
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3.2 Unemployment 
In the group-economy, there are  L Nn t t ) 1 ( ε −  unemployed workers and each of them collects an 
unemployment benefit of   from the government. U w
8  Therefore, the unemployment rate of the 
group-economy is: 











=   (5) 
 
For simplicity, the unemployment benefit is assumed to be the same as the wage rate of cottage-
firm, i.e.  . 1 = = Ci U w w
9 At time t, the cost to the government in maintaining the unemployment 
benefits is: 




As all workers attempt to spend their entire incomes, the aggregate demand for goods of the 
group-economy at time   is equal to the sum of the workers’ income of cottage-firms, i.e. 
Equation (2) multiplied by  , and that of technology-firms, i.e. Equation (4) multiplied 
by  , and the unemployment benefits of unemployed workers, i.e. Equation (6): 
t
) 1 ( t n N −
t Nn
   
L v n N
L Nn v L Nn L n N
Lw Nn w L Nn Lw n N Q
t t
t t t t t
U t t Ti t t Ci t t
) 1 (
) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 (





− + + + − =
− + + − =
(7) 
Based on the assumption that each worker buys equal quantity of goods produced by each firm, 
both cottage-firm and technology-firm face a similar demand: 
  L v n
N
Q
Q Q t t
t
t Ti t Ci ) 1 ( , , ε + = = =   (8) 
 
                                                 
8  Without an unemployment benefit system, the unemployed workers may continue to consume the goods produced 
by both the cottage-firms and the technology-firms using their savings. When their savings are used up, instead of 
growing towards the high equilibrium, the economy may fall back to the low equilibrium or even into depression. 
9 If  , the workers may not have the incentive to work. In order to minimize the work disincentive effect, 
the government can set the dole   to be much lower than  . As long as the dole is greater than the critical 
value,  , as shown in Equation  ), the spillover demand remains positive and the dynamic path continues to 
move towards high equilibrium. A lower w  does not affect the characteristics of the model except it dampens or 
slows down the big-push process. 
C U w w =
UC w
U w C w
U
(9
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3.4  Critical Value of Unemployment Benefit 
The critical value of unemployment benefit is the minimum unemployment benefit in order to 
generate a positive aggregate spillover demand to power the big-push process as discussed in 
Section 3.12. Subtracting the initial demand ( ) from the aggregate demand (Q ), the 




NL Qt t − = . By equating the aggregate 
spillover demand to zero, the critical value of the unemployment benefit can be derived as shown 
below: 
0 = − = NL Q D t t  
Substituting Equation (7) into the above equation: 












) 1 ( 1
  (9) 
 
When the unemployment benefit is lower than the critical value   as shown in Equation (9), 
the aggregate spillover demand is negative and subsequently the economy will fall into 
depression, similar to the aggregate demand argument by Keynes (1936). 
UC w
 
3.5  Surplus Inventory / Under-employment 
By subtracting its output from the demand for its goods at time t, the period inventory of a 
technology firm is: 
  L v n L v n L Q Y G t t t t t t Ti t Ti t Ti ) 1 ) (( ) 1 ( , , , − − = + − = − = ε α ε αε   (10) 
  
With imperfect knowledge of demand, the technology-firm may face one of the following 
situations depending on its sales forecast and hence its output:  
i.  Surplus Inventory ( )  0 , > t Ti G
When the technology-firm is too aggressive in its sales forecast, it will have surplus 
inventory if it produces more goods than the demand, i.e.Y  or  t Ti t Ti Q , , > ) /( 1 v nt t − > α ε . 
ii.  Under-employment ( G )  0 , < t Ti
When the technology is too conservative in its sales forecast, it will face excess demand for 
its goods if its output is less than the demand, Y t Ti t Ti Q , , <  or  ) /( 1 v nt t − < α ε . Since the 
technology-firm has industrialized, this excess demand faced by the technology-firm does 
not constitute as a spillover demand but a loss of sales revenue due to shortage of stock. 
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iii.  Zero inventory ( )  0 , = t Ti G
When the technology-firm makes accurate sales forecast for all periods, it will not hold 
inventory if its output exactly equals the demand, i.e. Y t Ti t Ti Q , , =  or  ) /( 1 v nt t − = α ε . 
 
3.6  The Optimal Employment Rate 
Assuming that a technology-firm has the perfect knowledge of future demand for its goods, by 
equating the output to meet the future demand, the optimal employment rate of a technology-
firm is: 
10 
t Ti t Ti Q Y , , =   








    w h e r e  1 1 / ≤ ≤ t ε α .  (11) 
The employment rate will recover to 100% ( 1 = t ε ) at the high full-employment equilibrium 
when the economy attains full industrialization ( 1 = τ n ) and all technology-firms pay their 
workers a wage premium equals the productivity gain ( 1 − =α v ), as discussed in Section 4.5.4. 
 

















,   (3a) 
 
where θ  is the ratio of wage premium on productivity ( α θ / v = ) where  γ θ < ≤ 0,  a s   1 − <α v , 
and  α α γ / ) 1 − ( = , which is the proportionate productivity gain. 
 
At the optimal employment rate, a technology-firm has no excess inventory. Compared to its 




















= = − ≡ ∇
1
, ,   (12) 
                                                 
10At the optimal employment rate, a technology-firm maximizes its profit by maximizing its sales while minimizing 
the holding cost of inventory. 
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3.7 Spillover  Demand 
The spillover demand of a cottage-firm equals its demand minus its output, i.e. Equation (8) 
minus Equation (1): 
  t Ti t t Ci t Ci t Ci Y vL n Y Q D , , , ∇ = = − = ε   (13) 
 
Since the demand for the good produced by a cottage-firm is the same as that of a technology-
firm, the spillover demand of a cottage-firm is the same as the extra output of a technology-firm. 
A cottage-firm cannot fulfil its spillover demand unless it industrializes and increases its output 
by investing in the new technology. Therefore the spillover demand has an incentive effect of 
enticing the cottage-firm to industrialize. In reality, the spillover demand may persist or diminish 
in the future. This model, however, assumes that the spillover demand vanishes at the next 
period. 
 



















,   (13a) 
 
Hence, the aggregate spillover demand of the economy equals the spillover demand of a cottage-
firm multiplied by the number of cottage-firm, i.e. Equation (13) multiplied by  :  ) 1 ( t n N −
  vL n n N D n N D t t t t Ci t t C ε ) 1 ( ) 1 ( , , − = − =   (14) 
 
 
3.8 Operating  Profit 
Without investing in the new technology, a cottage-firm is just breaking even and hence has zero 
operating profit, i.e. Equation (1) minus Equation (2): 
0 , = − = Π = Π Ci Ci Ci t Ci W Y  
 
If its output is greater than or equal to the demand, then the operating profit before loan 
repayment of a technology-firm equals its output minus its labour cost, i.e. Equation (3) minus 
Equation (4); otherwise, the operating profit of a technology-firm equals the demand minus its 
labour cost, i.e. Equation (8) minus Equation (4): 















ε αε     f o r  
v nt − α
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t Ti t Ti t Ti
)] 1 ) 1 ( ( 1 [
) 1 ( ) 1 (
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− − + =
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− = Π
ε
ε ε    for 
v nt − α
1
≥ ε  
(15) 
 
A monopolist firm is only willing to industrial if it can make a profit after it industrializes. 
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,   (15a) 
 
3.9 Savings 
The workers of technology-firms have “forced savings” because their extra demands (due to the 
income effect) for the goods produced by the cottage-firms cannot be fulfilled. For 
) /( 1 v nt − ≤ α ε , the total demand is greater than or equal to the total supply of the group-
economy and hence there is no surplus inventory. Then the period savings of a technology-firm 
equals the total demand (Equation (7) minus the total supply of the group-economy (Equation (1 
multiplied by   plus Equation (3 multiplied by  ) divided by the number of 
technology-firms ( ). For 
) 1 ( t n N −
t Nn
t Nn
) /( 1 v nt − ≥ α ε , the period savings of a technology-firm at time t is 
simply the aggregate spillover demand of cottage-firms divided by the number of technology-
firms, i.e. Equation (14) divided by  :  t Nn
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In summary, compared to the workers of cottage-firm, each of  L t ε  workers of a technology-firm 
has a higher income of  , of which he spends n  on the goods produced by the technology-
firms. Hence, compared to a worker of cottage-firm, each worker of technology-firm has an extra 
consumption of  . In addition, he has a saving of 
v v t
v nt v nt) 1 ( −  because his extra demand for the 
goods produced by the cottage-firm cannot be fulfilled.  
 
3.10 Consumption 
For a cottage-firm, the total consumption of workers equals the labour cost, i.e. Equation(2): 
L W C C Ci Ci t Ci = = = ,   (17) 
 
Similarly, the total consumption of unemployed workers equals the total unemployment benefits, 
i.e. Equation (6): 
  L Nn W C t t t U t U ) 1 ( , , ε − = =   (18) 
 
On the other hand, the total consumption of workers of a technology-firm equals the labour cost 
minus the period savings of a technology-firm, i.e. Equation (4) minus Equation (16):  
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The total extra consumption of workers of a technology-firm equals the total consumption of a 
technology-firm minus the original consumption (i.e. the wage rate of cottage-firm multiplied by 
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3.11  Finance the Investment 
Using its operating profit to finance its investment in the new technology, the available fund of a 
technology firm for investment at each period is  t Ti, Π , i.e. Equation (15). To finance the new 
technology, the technology-firm takes a loan B  at time t  and pays off the loan at time  . 
Since the firm takes a total of   periods to repay the loan, the capability of a technology-
firm to finance the investment at time   is the present values of its operating profits: 
1 2 t
) 1 2 ( t t −
t1
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where  r  is the applicable period interest rate. 
 
At the optimal employment rate, the available fund for investment is:  




































  (21a) 
 
The monopolist firm will industrialize if the following three necessary and sufficient conditions 
are satisfied: 
i.  0 > α ,   and  0 > v v + >1 α . The productivity gain from using the new technology must be 
greater than the wage premium paid to the workers. 
ii.   and  L Ft t Ti ≥ Π , B ≥ ℑ . The investment fund available is equal to or greater than the cost of 
the new IRS technology; and the profit at each period is equal to or greater than the period 
repayment. 
iii.  There is an efficient capital market where there are willing financiers for the investments. 
 
However, the above three conditions are necessary but not sufficient to ensure that the economy 
attains the high-equilibrium. For a successful big-push, the following conditions must prevail as 
well: 
i.  All monopolist firms industrialize and are successful in their investments; 
ii.  The goods produced by the industrialized firms are complementary; 
iii.  All workers spend their incomes on domestic complementary good; 
iv.  The government is capable of sustaining the unemployment benefits. 
 
3.12 Dynamic  Path 
Predicting that the spillover demand will persist in the future, the cottage-firms may decide to 
industrialize so that they can increase their outputs and incomes. Indirectly, the excess spillover 
demand entices the cottage-firms to industrialize because they can produce higher output, while 
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the workers can earn higher wages and hence can afford higher consumption. Facing spillover 
demand, the cottage-firms have the follow two options: 
i.  If the profit generated by the spillover demand is not sufficient to cover the investment 
cost, the cottage-firm waits for the spillover demand to increase, as Equation (13) shows 
that the spillover demand increases with the industrialization state. 
ii. If the spillover demand is sufficient to cover the investment cost, the cottage-firm 
industrializes and invests in new technology so that it can increase its output to fulfil the 
spillover demand. 
 
In fact, the spillover demand can be treated as a signal for investment. Increasing spillover 
demand for some given number of consecutive periods may be a good signal for investment to 
some entrepreneurs. There are many possible ways an entrepreneur can react to spillover 
demands. This model employs a very simple method by assuming that the number of cottage-
firm enticed to industrialize equals the aggregate spillover demand divided by the output of a 
cottage-firm. In short, this model assumes that the probability of industrialization of a 
monopolist firm depends on the level of aggregate spillover demand. 
 
Knowing the aggregate spillover demand of the economy, the proportion of cottage-firm enticed 
to industrialize equals the aggregate spillover demand divided by the output of a cottage-firm 









t C ε ) 1 (
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Then the industrialization state,   at time , equals to the previous industrialization state,  , 
plus the proportion of the newly industrialized firms










− + =  
v n n n n t t t t t 1 1 1 1 ) 1 ( − − − − − + = ∴ ε    where  t ,  1 ≥ 0 0 = n  and  1 = τ n .  (22) 
 
                                                 
11 Leow (2004) extends this equation to allow fluctuation of industrialization state due to investment failure and 
hence deindustrialization of firms. Depending on the cascading effect, a big cascading collapse of firms will create a 
financial crisis. 
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Mathematically, Equation (22a) can also be expressed as a function of three parameters: 
{} θ , , 1 n t nt . Thus the industrialization state variable is determined by the following three 
parameters: 
i.   increases with t, time;  t n
ii.   increases with  , the kick-start fraction of industrialized firms;  t n 1 n
iii.   increases faster with  t n θ . If θ  is zero, industrialization will not progress. The higher is 
the ratio of wage premium on productivity, the higher is the spillover demand which will 
entice more cottage-firms to industrialize. 
 
Equation (22) characterises the dynamic path of big-push, as it determines the industrialization 
state   at time  . Equations, which contain the industrialization state variable, also depend on 
these three parameters: time, kick-start fraction and ratio of wage premium to productivity. 
t n t
 
We can find the steady states of the dynamic path by substituting  1 − = = t t n n n  into Equation (22) 
and solving for n . The steady states of the dynamic path are  0 = n  and  1 = n , which are the low 
and high equilibrium of big-push. 
 
4. The  Characteristics 
 
Armed with the model constructed in Section 3, I explore and establish the intrinsic and 
economic characteristics of big-push, and analyse their dynamic behaviours. As discussed in 
Section 4.1 to 4.4, this model has four intrinsic characteristics:  
i.  This model is a multi-equilibrium model; 
ii.  It has the low and high steady states, which are the low and high equilibrium, 
corresponding to no-industrialization and full-industrialization state; 
iii.  It needs a “kick-start” (a big-push) to initiate a big-push process; 
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iv.  It exhibits a typical S-shaped dynamic path. However, it can exhibit chaotic behaviour 
when the ratio of wage premium on productivity is larger than a certain value. 
 
In addition, within its simple economic structure, this model exhibits six economic 
characteristics of big-push: (1) high growth, (2) spillover demand, (3) excess supply, (4) 
unemployment, (5) income inequality, and (6) debt and capital inflow, which are discussed in 
Section 4.5 to 4.10 respectively. 
 
4.1 Multiple  Equilibrium 
This simple dynamic model is able to demonstrate similar multiple-equilibrium characteristic as 
depicted in the Murphy et al. (1989). The firm will industrialise if its profit at each period, as 
shown in Equation (15a), is equal to or greater than the period repayment (for the loan to 














The above condition shows that this simple dynamic model of big-push can have two 
equilibriums, one with and one without industrialisation. In the low equilibrium, no firm incurs 
the fixed cost for fear of not being able to break even, and the population stays in cottage 
production. For no industrialization to take place, where  0 = t n , the following condition must 
prevail: 
L Ft t Ti ≤ Π ,  
0 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ≤ + − − ∴ v Ft α   (23) 
 
In the high equilibrium, all sectors industrialize. All firms expect a high level of sales resulting 
from simultaneous labour-saving industrialisation (where  ) 1 = t n  and are consequently happy to 
incur the fixed cost B  to invest in new technology, only if their profits are positive: 
L Ft t Ti ≥ Π ,  
0 1 ) 1 )( ( ≥ − − − ∴ t F v α   (24) 
 
The two conditions, as shown in Equation (23) and (24), suggest that there always exist some 
values of F for which both equilibriums coexist. For these values of F, the economy is capable of 
a big-push, whereby it can move from low to high equilibrium. This illustrates that the economy 
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is capable of sustaining two alternative levels of industrialization, which are the low and high 
equilibrium. At low equilibrium, it is unprofitable for each firm to industrialize individually. 
However, it becomes profitable to industrialize as long as there is a sufficient number of firms 
from other sectors industrialize simultaneously. 
 
Plotting the two conditions as shown in Equation (23) and (24) in a graph of productivity versus 
wage premium with  5 . 0 = F , Figure 2 shows that there exist three possible regions: (1) region of 
high equilibrium, (2) region of low equilibrium and (3) region of multi-equilibrium. The static 
model by Murphy et al. (1989) assumes that the economy is either at low or high equilibrium, 
and makes the expectation of industrialization self-fulfilling. Their big-push takes the form of 
simultaneous industrialization of many sectors, each generating future income that helps the 
profitability of other sectors. 
 




























































25 . 0 = n
75 . 0 = n




8 . 0 = F
 
 
On the contrary, this model is not a self-fulfilling but a progressive growth model where a big-
push could be as simple as a government building an infrastructure project. Figure 3 show an 
hypothetical example where there is an economy consists of only four monopolist firms, Firm-A 
to Firm-D. Each firm requires a different technology which offers different productivity at the 
same cost of  . If the government is able to encourage the Firm-D to industrialize first, 
then the Firm-A becomes profitable to industrialize since 
8 . 0 = F
25 . 0 = n  after the Firm-D 
industrializes. Similarly, the Firm-B becomes profitable to industrialize at   after the Firm-
A and Firm-D industrialize. Subsequently the Firm-C industrializes and the economy attains full 
industrialization. As long as the government is able to encourage or ‘push’ the firm with highest 
‘industrialization barrier’ to industrialize first (Firm-D in this example), the economy may just 
5 . 0 = n
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roll itself progressively to full industrialization. Large infrastructure project is possibly the 
investment with the highest ‘industrialization barrier’ which the government of emerging 
economy needs to establish in order to facilitate a big-push process. Infrastructure in general and 
railroads in particular, has been commonly credited with being the important component of the 
big push (Rostow 1960, Rosenstein-Rodan 1961). 
 
Dismissing the static and self-fulfilling models by Murphy et al (1989), this model introduces the 
transitional disequilibrium states and captures the significance of big-push to steer the economy 
from low to high equilibrium by introducing a big-push as a ‘kick-start’ to a industrialization 
process as described in Section 4.3. 
 
4.2  Low and High Equilibrium ( , )  0 n τ n
The workers of a technology-firm have aggregate extra consumption by the amount as show in 
Equation (20). This extra consumption increases with the industrialization state, and it increases 
faster with a higher wage premium. Since there is no extra consumption for the workers of 
cottage-firm, the extra consumption of the economy equals the extra consumption of a 
technology-firm multiplied by the number of technology-firm, i.e. Equation (20) multiplied by 
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Equation (25) shows that the extra consumption of the economy increases exponentially with the 
industrialization state as shown in Figure 4. Figure 5 shows the plot of the extra consumption of 
the group-economy against time is an S-shaped curve. 
 
When there is no firm industrialized ( 0 0 = n ), there is no extra consumption, i.e.  0 0 = ∇ ; and 
hence this steady state is known as the low equilibrium. On the other hand, when all firms are 
industrialized ( ), the extra consumption is 
C












∇ , which is positive, 
as 1 ) < / 1 1 ( − < α θ  is a necessary condition for a big-push; and hence this steady state is known 
as the high equilibrium. In summary, the economy enjoys a higher output and consumption by 
attaining the high equilibrium with full industrialization through a big-push process. 
 
4.3 Kick-start  (n )  1
Equation (22) demonstrates that the dynamic path, which is a recursive equation, needs a kick-
start in order to initiate a big-push process. Without a kick-start or a big-push, the economy is 
trapped at low equilibrium. In order to kick-start a big-push process, at least one monopolist firm 
must industrialize, even though its investment may not be profitable. Simply,   is a 
necessary condition to launch a big-push process but not sufficient for a successful big-push. 
0 1 > n
 
The kick-start fraction ( ) can influence the time ( 1 n τ ) an economy takes to reach the high 
equilibrium. The dynamic path equation, Equation (22), shows that the bigger is the push or the 
kick-start fraction (n ), the shorter is the time ( 1 τ ) an economy takes to attain the high 
equilibrium. 
 
Examples of the prevalent “kick-start” economic policies employed by governments of emerging 
economies are tax subsidies, incentives on investment, minimum wage policy and etc. For 
instance, the Singapore government attempted to stimulate industrial upgrading by raising labour 
costs after 1979 (Rodrik, 1996). The World Bank (1993) reports that the governments of East 
Asian countries provided producers with subsidies to promote investment and exports, thus 
pursuing high growth strategies.  
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4.4  Dynamic Path ( )  t n













t t t n
n
n n n  
where at time t ,   in order to kick-start a big-push process. Equation (22a) shows that 
the dynamic path is driven only by 
1 = 0 1 > n
θ , the ratio of wage premium on productivity. Simply, an 
increase in productivity is a necessary but not sufficient condition for industrialization. A big-
push process can only be successful if the firms are willing to share their profits with their 
workers, for example, by paying their workers a wage premium. The higher is the ratio of wage 
premium on productivity, the higher is the spillover demand which will entice more cottage-
firms to industrialize. As a result, the higher is the ratio of wage premium on productivity, the 
shorter is the time (τ ) taken to achieve the high equilibrium ( 1 = τ n ). 
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Depending on the value of θ , this model can exhibit one of the following four types of dynamic 
path: S path (Figure 6), Oscillation path (Figure 7), Chaotic path (Figure 8) and Radical path 
(Figure 9). Except the S path, the other three dynamic paths have value greater than unity which 
contravene the condition 0 . 1 ≤ t n ≤
12 As a result, only the S path is used in the analysis of this 
model. 
 
Figure 6 shows the plot of   against time for different values of  t n θ . The plot exhibits a smooth 
S-shaped curve, where the dynamic path starts off slowly at the earlier periods, and gains 
maximum speed in the middle but slows down at the later periods, before reaching the high 
equilibrium. Figure 10 shows the plots of   for different values of   when  t n 1 n 25 . 0 = θ . For a 
higher kick-start fraction, the dynamic path takes a shorter time to attain the high equilibrium. 
Rather than waiting for the income effect and spillover demand to take effect progressively, the 
economy receives a jump-start if there are more firms responding to the government’s 
investment incentive. As a result, a more rapid progression to the high equilibrium can be 
expected. 
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4.5 High  Growth 
High growth is one of the key features of a big-push process because of the progressive 
“synchronization” of industrialization across sectors. The economic growth gains its maximum 
momentum in the middle of a big-push process where the aggregate spillover demand has its 
                                                 
12 Leow (2004) offers plausible economic interpretations for the Oscillation, Chaotic and Radical paths, where the 
value of greater than unity for the industrialization state is interpreted as “over-industrialization”. The high ratio of 
wage premium on productivity drives the economy to grow in chaotic manner, which may lead to a financial crisis.  
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maximum value. As the output, the consumption and the disposable income are closely 
interrelated in this model, they exhibit similar high growth behaviour. 
 
4.5.1 Output 
While the output of a cottage-firm remains constant at L, the output of a technology firm 
increases with industrialization state according to Equation (3a).  The output growth rate of a 



































,   (26) 
 
Figure 11 shows that the output of a technology-firm follows an S-shaped curve, and increases 
with time and industrialization state. With a higher ratio of wage premium on productivity, it 
increases faster and attains a higher output. Due to the wage premium constraint, i.e.  , 1 − <α v  
productivity can exert its effects on the output of a technology-firm because a higher ratio of 
wage premium on productivity is only possible with higher level of productivity. For example, 
when  2 = α , the highest possible ratio of wage premium on productivity is 0.5; whereas when 
4 = α , the highest possible ratio of wage premium on productivity is 0.75. Figure 12 shows the 
plot of output growth rate of a technology-firm is a bell-shaped curve. 
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Generally, an investment plan has lower sales forecasts at the early periods and then gradually 
increases the forecasts at the later periods. Although the sales and marketing campaigns are 
generally attributed to the sales forecasts, this model demonstrates that this is, in fact, the natural 
outcome of the dynamic path of big-push. 
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The aggregate output of the group-economy is just the sum of the aggregate output of cottage-
firms, i.e. Equation (1) multiplied by  ) 1 ( t n N − , and that of technology-firms, i.e. Equation (3a) 
multiplied by  :  t Nn
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Figure 13 shows that the aggregate output of the group-economy follows an S-shaped curve, and 
increases with time and industrialization state. With a higher wage premium, it grows faster and 
attains a higher output when the economy attains the high equilibrium. 
 
Figure 14 shows that the output growth rate of the group-economy ( ) is a bell-shaped 
curve. The bell-shaped growth curves are taller and narrower when the ratio of wage premium on 
productivity is higher; and flatter and wider when the ratio of wage premium on productivity is 
lower. With a higher ratio of wage premium on productivity, the economy can achieve a higher 
growth, which can be sustained above 10% for a number of periods as shown in Figure 14. 
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A good empirical example of high output growth is the miraculous growth rate in the East Asian 
economy before the 1997 Asian crisis, as shown in Table 1. “The overall picture is quite clear: in 
the East Asian countries, GDP growth rates were remarkably high in the 1990s. Growth rates 
averaging more than 7 percent of GDP (sometimes closer to 10 percent) were the norm.” 
(Corsetti et al., 1999, pg. 315). In addition, the Chinese economy has a high growth for the past 




Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Thailand
90-96 Avg 7.3 7.7 8.8 2.8 8.5
1996 8 7.1 8.6 5.7 5.5





The aggregate consumption of the group-economy is the sum of the aggregate consumption of 
workers of cottage-firm (Equation (17 multiplied by  ) 1 ( t n N − ), and of technology-firm 
(Equation (19 multiplied by  ), and the consumption of unemployed workers (Equation (18):  t Nn
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Equation (28a) shows that the aggregate consumption of the group-economy equals the 
aggregate output of the group-economy. Therefore, the plots of the aggregate consumption and 
growth rate of consumption of the group-economy ( t C ∆ % ) are similar to Figure 13 and Figure 
14, with the same S-shaped curve and bell-shaped curve respectively. 
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4.5.3 Disposable  Income 
The aggregate disposable income of the group-economy is the sum of the wages of workers of 
cottage-firms, i.e. Equation (2) multiplied by  ) 1 ( t n N − , and that of technology-firms, i.e. 
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Figure 15 and Figure 16 show that the aggregate disposable income and growth rate of 
disposable income ( t W ∆ % ) of the group-economy are an S-shaped curve and a bell-shaped 
curve respectively. Outside the low and high equilibrium, Figure 17 shows that the aggregate 
disposable income is always higher than the aggregate output because there is a spillover 
demand for the goods produced by the cottage-firms while the workers of technology-firms have 
“forced” savings. Compared to the aggregate output or consumption, Figure 18 shows that the 
disposable income grows at a faster rate at the earlier periods but at slower rate at the later 
periods. 
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As shown in Figure 19, there is a close similarity between the initial S-shaped curve shown by 
the plots of per-capital income of China for rural and urban household, and the S-shaped curve of 
aggregate disposable income simulated by this model. The fact that the income of urban 
household increases faster than that of urban household shows that the ratio of wage premium on 





Source: China Statistical Yearbook, 1997 
 
4.5.4 High  Full-employment  Equilibrium 
In this model, the growth rate is proportional to the ratio of the wage premium to productivity. 
Although productivity is an important factor in driving economic growth, this model provides an 
                                                 
13 This implies a productivity-linked wage system, where the ratio of wage premium over productivity stays 
approximately the same over time. 
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understanding that the distribution of productivity gain or wage premium cannot be ignored if a 
government want to steer an economy towards the high full-employment equilibrium, with 
maximum output and consumption (Y NL W C α τ τ τ = = = ) and full employment ( 1 = τ ε ). 
 
4.6 Spillover  Demand 
Equation (13a) shows the spillover demand faced by a cottage-firm during the big-push process. 
As shown in Figure 20, the spillover demand of a cottage-firm increases with time and 
industrialization state. It increases faster and reaches a higher value with a higher ratio of wage 
premium on productivity. 
 
The aggregate spillover demand in the economy equals the spillover demand faced by a cottage-
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Figure 21 the aggregate spillover demand follows a bell-shaped curve. There is no spillover 
demand at both the low and high equilibrium. When the wage premium equals the productivity 
gain, i.e. ( v + =1 α ), the spillover demand reaches a maximum value and exerts its optimum 
effect on the dynamic path such that the time taken to attain the high equilibrium is the shortest. 
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4.7 Surplus  Inventory 
While the cottage-firm faces spillover demand, the technology-firms may face surplus inventory 
if they produce more than the demand. The period inventory of a technology-firm is as shown in 
Equation (10).  
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For  and  5 . 0 = v 2 = α , Figure 22 shows that the plot of period inventory versus time for various 
employment rates displays reverse-S curves. For employment rate at 0.8 and 1.0, the period 
inventory persists after the economy attains the high equilibrium. For an employment rate at 0.6, 
the period inventory is positive at the initial periods and crosses into the negative at the later 
periods, indicating that there is “under-employment” because the technology-firm is too 
conservative in its sales forecast. For  1 = v  where the wage premium equals the productivity 
gain, Figure 23 shows similar but steeper reverse-S curves and there is no period inventory at full 
employment when the economy attains high equilibrium. 
 
In the economy, only the technology-firms may have surplus inventory if their sales forecasts are 
too aggressive. Therefore the aggregate period inventory of the economy is the period inventory 
of a technology-firm multiplied by the number of technology-firm, i.e. Equation (10) multiplied 
by  :  t Nn
  L v n Nn G Nn G t t t t Ti t t ) 1 ) (( , − − = = ε α   (31) 
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For  , Figure 24 shows that the plots of period inventory against time displays an S-shaped 
curve with high employment rate (
5 . 0 = v
8 . 0 = ε  or  1 = ε ) but reversed-S-shaped curve with a low 
employment rate ( 6 . 0 = ε ). For  , when wage premium equals the productivity gain, Figure 
25 shows that the plots of period inventory against time are bell-shaped with high employment 
rate (
1 = v
1 = ε ) but reversed-S curves with low employment rate ( 6 . 0 = ε  or  8 . 0 = ε ). There is also 
no period inventory at full employment when the economy attains high equilibrium. 
 
Facing surplus inventory, a technology-firm can take one of the following actions: 
i. Reduce  Production 
The technology-firm can be more conservative in its sales forecast and cut back its 
production by decreasing the employment rate. Reduction in production can mean surplus 
capacity if the investment is lumpy. Since the capital and material cost are not included in 
the production function, this model cannot simulate the loss of capital opportunity due to 
under-utilization of production capacity. Large infrastructure projects are good examples of 
lumpiness in investment. Infrastructure such as an airport will not be built without enough 
potential industrial customers. On the other hand, without the infrastructure, 
industrialization will not take place. It is not uncommon to have infrastructure with low 
utilization or surplus capacity at the initial periods because infrastructure is usually a long-
term investment. In the emerging economies, examples of excess capacities which are 
commonly blamed for tilting the economy towards financial crises are commercial property 
such as vacant office spaces, and the under-utilized infrastructures such as big airports. 
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ii. Decrease  Price 
The technology-firm can drop the price in order to clear its surplus inventory. Facing a 
unitary elastic demand curve, this may not be a practical option because lowering the price 
does not increase the firm’s revenue. 
 
iii. Export  Goods 
Since the goods are assumed to be perishable and ruined at the next period, surplus 
inventory is just wastage when the technology-firm is not able to find a market to dispose 
them within the current period. However, for non-perishable goods, the surplus inventory 
can be stored to fulfil future demand by reducing the output for the next period. There is a 
domestic pressure to export the surplus inventory if there are foreign economies which can 
absorb the surplus inventory. In this case, the foreign economies may be embraced into the 
big-push process.
14 Theoretically, exports will not interfere with the big-push process, and 
can accelerate the pace of big-push unless exports compete with domestic demand. In this 
model, the surplus inventory is always the excess supply of a collection of goods for 
which there is no domestic demand. Generally, stimulating economic growth by 
encouraging export provides the following advantages to a big-push process: 
•  It reduces unemployment and hence the government can save the outlay of 
unemployment benefits; 
•  Firms can afford to pay higher wage premiums, which stimulate faster growth towards 
high equilibrium; 
•  It reduces the foreign debts, capital inflow and account deficit of emerging economies. 
 
4.8 Unemployment 
As shown in Equation (5), the unemployment rate of the group-economy is U ) 1 ( t t t n ε − = . At 






















) ( ) 1 (
  (5a) 
 
                                                 
14 Using similar principle, this model can be extended to study a big-push process involving two or more economies. 
This may be used to explain the cross-country contagion effect of financial crisis. 
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Figure 26 and Figure 27 show the plots of the unemployment rate of the group-economy against 
the industrialization state and time respectively. For a given level of productivity, the 
unemployment rate decreases with wage premium. When the wage premium equals the 
productivity gain,  1 − = α v , the plot show a bell-shaped curve. The unemployment rate 
decreases to zero when the full industrialization is attained. 
 
When the wage premium is less than the productivity gain, the unemployment rate persists at the 
) /( ) 1 ( v v − − − α α level after the economy attains the high equilibrium. In another words, the 
economy fails to reach full employment at high equilibrium when the wage premium is less than 
the productivity gain. This is a sub-optimal high equilibrium because there are still unemployed 
workers collecting unemployment benefits which is less than the disposable income of a 
employed worker,  ) 1 ( v + . However, the technology-firm cannot afford to pay a wage premium 
equal to the productivity gain ( 1 − =α v ) unless the new technology is free ( 0 = F ). 
Nevertheless, the high full-employment equilibrium can be recovered if the technology-firms pay 




In conclusion, there is an incentive for a government to push for the high full-employment 
equilibrium by encouraging the firms to share their profits by paying their workers a maximum 
                                                 
15 Without an unemployment benefit system, small-service labour-intensive industry may sprout in an emerging 
economy. This small-service industry may develop into a tertiary service industry when the economy becomes 
developed when the employment rate (ε ) does not recover to full employment. 
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wage premium. Alternatively, the government can enforce a productivity-linked wage system to 




Source: See Xue and Zhong, 2003 
 
Xue and Zhong (2003) attempted to estimate the real urban unemployment rate in China. As 
shown in Figure 28, the plots of the adjusted and estimated urban unemployment rate from 1980 
to 2000 follow the familiar curves as shown in Figure 27. 
 
4.8.1 Unemployment  Benefit 
Equation (6) shows the cost to government in maintaining unemployment benefits. At the 
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,   (6a) 
 
As  , the plots of unemployment benefits against industrialization state and time are 
similar to those in Figure 26 and Figure 27. On one hand, the technology-firm wants to minimize 
the financial burden of its debt by paying the minimum wage premium; on the other hand, the 
government wants to minimise the unemployment by encouraging the technology-firms to pay 
the maximum wage premium. 
1 = u w
 
When the wage premium is less than the productivity gain, even if the government is able to tax 
all the “forced” savings of workers of technology-firm, it still needs to cope with the minimum 
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cost of unemployment benefits, which is the difference between the unemployment benefits and 
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Considering the welfare of the economy by minimising the aggregate debts of technology-firms 
and the cost of unemployment benefits of the government, the optimum wage premium can be 
shown to be half of the productivity gain if the technology-firms increase the wage premiums to 
the value of the productivity gain after their debts are cleared. 
 
4.9 Income  Inequality 
In this model, there are three tiers income structure, which are (1) the workers of cottage-firm, 
(2) the workers of technology-firm, and (3) the unemployed workers. Since the workers of 
technology-firm receive a wage premium, they have comparatively higher disposable incomes, 
and hence higher consumption and period savings. As a result, income inequality evolves as time 
and industrialization state progress. The dynamic behaviours of disposable income, period 
savings and Gini coefficient are discussed in Section 4.9.1, 4.9.2 and 4.9.3 respectively. 
 
4.9.1 Disposable  Income 
Compared to a cottage-firm worker, each technology-firm worker has an extra disposable 
income of  . Therefore the extra disposable income of workers in a technology-firm equals the 
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Multiplied Equation (32a) by the number of technology-firm ( ), the aggregate extra 
disposable income of the economy is:  
t Nn
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As shown in Figure 29 and Figure 30, the extra disposable income is always positive and 
increases with the industrialization state, reaching a maximum value at the high equilibrium,. 




Besides having higher consumption, the workers of technology-firm have period savings as 
shown in Equation (16a). Figure 31 shows the plots of the period saving of a technology-firm 
against time. At the kick-start of big-push process, the period savings are at a maximum and then 
decrease with time until the period savings disappear when the high equilibrium is attained. At 
the early states of big-push, the period savings are high but the number of technology-firm is 
small. Consequently, there is small number of workers of technology-firm who earn higher 
income than the workers of cottage-firm. Besides enjoying higher consumption than those 
workers of cottage-firm, the workers of technology-firm have ‘forced’ savings because the right 
collection of domestic goods (produced by cottage-firms) is in short supply. With a higher ratio 
of wage premium on productivity, the period savings have a higher maximum value but 
decreases at a faster rate with time. 
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Since the workers of cottage-firm do not have savings, the aggregate period savings of the 
economy is the period savings of a technology-firm multiplied by the number of technology-
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As Equation (34) is the same as Equation (29), the period savings of the economy is the same as 
the spillover demand of the economy because the period savings are the “forced savings” due to 
the unfulfilled spillover demand.  Thus, the plot of aggregate period savings of the economy 
against time follows a bell-shaped curve as shown in Figure 21.  
 
Chang and Velasco (1998, pg. 13) assert, “The Asean-5 countries saved a lot, and invested even 
more. Correspondingly, their current accounts were generally in deficit”. Asian countries were 
characterised by very high savings rates throughout 1990s (Corsetti et al., 1999). The savings 
over GDP ratios for the Asean-5 countries range from 22.7% in Philippines to 40.6% in Malaysia 
as shown in Table 2. 
Table 2 
Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Thailand
90-96 Avg 28.4 35.4 34.6 19.1 28.6
1996 30.6 33.9 40.6 22.7 31.5




                                                 
16 The jobless workers may use their savings to maintain their livelihood. This will have a negative impact on the 
aggregate savings of the economy. 
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4.9.3 Gini  Coefficients 
Lorenz curve and Gini Coefficients are common and effective ways of showing the inequality of 
income. Knowing that there are  L Nn t t ) 1 ( ε −  unemployed workers receiving an unemployment 
benefit of  ,   workers of cottage-firm receiving an income of  1 = u w L n N t) 1 ( − 1 = Ci w , and 
L Nn t tε  workers of technology-firm receiving an income of  ) 1 ( v wTi + = , the Gini Coefficient of 














  (35) 
 
Figure 32 and Figure 33 shows the plots of Gini Coefficients against the industrialization state 
and against time respectively.  When the wage premium equals to productivity gain,  v + =1 α , 
the inverted-U or bell-shaped curve displays a good match with the Kuznets (1955) curve, 
whereby inequality first increases then decreases during the process of economic development. 
This model encompasses the same principle as that behind the Kuznets Curve. The workers of 
technology-firm experience a rise in income and this change raises the economy’s overall degree 
of inequality. Initially the dominant effect is the expansion in size of the small and relatively rich 
group of workers of technology-firm. 
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When the wage premium is less than the productivity gain,  v + <1 α , the inverted-U curve stops 
short of reaching zero at high equilibrium, when  1 = τ n . As the Gini coefficient is higher than 
zero, the inequality persists because the economy fails to achieve full employment ( 1 < τ ε ) after 
attaining the high equilibrium. 
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As shown in Figure 34, at the early stage of big-push, the relationship between the level of per 
capital income and the extent of inequality tends to be positive. As the number of cottage-firm 
diminishes, the main effect on inequality from the continuing industrialization is that more of the 
unemployed and poor workers of cottage-firm are able to join the relatively rich workers of 
technology-firm. Many workers of technology-firm who started out at the bottom rungs tend to 
move up in relation to the richer workers. The decreasing size of the unemployed workers and 
the labour force of cottage-firm tend to drive up relative wages. This combination of forces 
reduces the overall inequality. Hence, at later stages of big-push, the relation between the level of 
per capital income and the extent of inequality tends to be negative. As a result, the full 
relationship between the Gini coefficient and the level of per-capital income is an inverted-U as 
shown in Figure 34. 
 
The World Bank (1997a) pointed out that even in East Asia including the four ‘tigers’, inequality 
is becoming more widespread, despite their successes in pulling millions of people out of 
poverty line. The report emphasizes the growing gap in earning power between skilled and 
unskilled workers in increasingly sophisticated economies. In China, both rural and urban 
inequality increased steadily between 1981 and 1995, where the urban Gini coefficient increased 
from 0.176 in 1981 to 0.275 in 1995 and the rural Gini coefficient increase from 0.242 in 1981 to 
0.333 in 1995 (World Bank, 1977b). In fact, the ‘miraculous’ phenomenon of entrepreneurs 
turning into ‘instant millionaires’
17 is not uncommon in the emerging economies with rapid 
growth. 
                                                 
17 “While it is part of the largely neglected southwest region of China, which receives little of the investment 
pumped in to the east coast, it boats its own breed of entrepreneur. One such man is Mr. Yin, who has become an 
almost instant millionaire at the age of 60.” (BBC News, 2002). 
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4.9.4 Import  Consumption 
Due to the spillover demand by the workers of technology-firm, there is a compelling pressure 
on the domestic economy to import the goods to fulfil the spillover demand if foreign economies 
can supply the right collection of goods. Moreover, the income disparity encourages 
differentiated consumption behaviour, where the affluent workers may desire to consume 
superior goods. 
 
Theoretically, importing goods to meet the domestic spillover demand will not interfere with the 
big-push process as long as the imported goods do not compete with domestic goods. As more 
and more cottage-firms industrialized with time, the domestic economy increases its output 
attempting to satisfy the spillover demand. However, if the differentiated consumption behaviour 
becomes entrenched and the import replacement refuses to take place, this inevitably will hinder 
or even reverse the progress of the big-push process. Burton (1955, pg 336) asserted, “Controls 
that reduce consumer imports may be necessary to change the pattern of consumption or to gain 
time until domestic output can be increased.” 
 
There are two ways the government can discourage import consumption: (1) investment and (2) 
tax. Firstly, the government can encourage the workers to invest their savings. If the population 
is generally not proficient or active in investment activity, or the domestic stock market is 
underdeveloped, the government can impose some kind of “forced” savings that can be used 
collectively as investment funds. For example, the Singapore government implemented the 
Central Providence Fund, which the government deploys as investment funds for government or 
commercial projects. If the workers of technology-firm invest their savings in the equity market, 
then the technology-firms can secure investment funds through a combination of equity and debt 
financing. The apparent advantages to the economy are:  
•  Discouragement of import consumption; 
•  Reduction of unnecessary capital inflow; 
•  Generation of more spillover demand from dividends as part of increased disposable 
incomes. 
 
However, encouraging investment may overheat the stock and property markets. Due to high 
sustaining growth and strong economic indicators, share and property prices can be bid beyond 
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the fundamental values, leading to an asset bubble in the economy. When the fragility of big 
push strikes, the asset bubble bursts. As a result, financial crises are mostly associated with a 
collapse in asset prices. 
 
Secondly, the government can impose higher taxes on the higher incomes of workers of 
technology-firm. Instead of import consumption, which can be detrimental to the domestic 
economy, the savings taxed can contribute toward the unemployment benefits, thus alleviating 
the financial burden on the government. However, since a wage premium of   is necessary to 
entice workers to work in a technology-firm, higher taxes may have an adverse effect of 
discouraging workers to work in a technology-firm. Alternatively, the workers may demand even 
higher wage premiums with which the firms may find the investments are no longer profitable. 
As a result, high taxes may in fact reverse the process of big-push. 
v
 
4.10  Debt and Capital Flow 
As a technology-firm takes a loan of B  to invest in the new IRS technology at period  , the 
debt of a technology-firm at time   is just the loan plus the interest minus the aggregate 
repayments, which are the firm’s operating profits, 
1 t
t
t Ti, Π , i.e. Equation (15), plus interest: 
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Figure 35 shows that the plot of operating profit of a technology-firm against time displays S-
shaped curves. The higher is the wage premium, the lower is the operating profit because the 
labour cost increases as wage premium increases. 
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Figure 36 shows the plots of debt of a technology-firm versus time for  2 = B  at  0 = t . For 
 or v , the debt decreases exponentially to zero but it decreases faster for  3 . 0 = v 5 . 0 = 3 . 0 = v
9 .
. In 
the case of v  or  , the debt increases with time but is faster for  , and the 
technology-firm can never pay back the loan because the cost of capital is more than the firm’s 
operating profit. Simply, for 
7 . 0 = 9 . 0 = v 0 = v
2 = α , 2 = B  and 1 . 0 = r , the technology-firm will not industrialize 
if it has to pay a wage premium of  7 . 0 = v  or more to entice the workers to work in a industrial 
environment. 
 
The aggregate debt of the economy at period t is the sum of debts of technology-firms which 
industrialize at any period between  0 1= t  to t t = 1 : 
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Figure 37 shows that the plots of aggregate debt of the economy exhibit bell-shaped curves. The 
higher is the wage premium, the higher is the aggregate debt that increases or decreases faster with 
a higher wage premium. Figure 38 shows that kick-start fraction does not have a significant effect 
on the magnitude of aggregate debt, except aggregate debt increases and decreases slightly faster 
with a higher kick-start fraction. 
 
For  or   and  , Figure 37 shows that the economy could not clear the debt as 
the debt is accumulating. In particular, the debt curve for 
7 . 0 = v 9 . 0 = v 1 . 0 1 = n
7 . 0 = v  shows that while the decreasing 
debts from t  to 38 may give the government a false signal that the aggregate debt of the 
economy is in control, the aggregate debt can suddenly run out of control as the economy can no 
longer sustain the cost of capital after 
14 =
39 = t . Hence, a declining debt structure does not imply a 
healthy underlying debt structure. With imperfection knowledge of complementarity, an economy 
that embarks on a big-push process in these conditions will head toward high unsustainable debts, 
which will eventually lead to the collapse of the economy or a financial crisis. 
 
Table 3 – Debt before the Asia ’97 Crisis 
Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Thailand
Jun-90 20,076        23,369        6,864          9,055          11,675       
Jun-94 30,902        48,132        13,874        5,990          36,545       
Jun-97 58,726        103,432      28,820        14,115        69,382       
Sources:  Bank of International Settlements 




Table 4 Foreign Debts 
Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Thailand
1990 65.89          13.79          35.80          69.02          32.80         
1991 68.21          13.51          35.48          71.45          38.38         
1992 68.74          14.34          34.51          62.29          37.51         
1993 56.44          14.18          40.74          66.09          34.10         
1994 60.96          14.32          40.40          62.42          33.31         
1995 61.54          23.80          39.31          53.21          33.78         
1996 56.74          28.40          40.06          49.75          50.05         
Sources: World Bank Data (See Table 23, Corsetti e. al., 1999)
Foreign Debt (% of GDP)
 
 
Since emerging economies are in the middle of industrialization and the developed economies are 
at industrialization states near to the high equilibrium, Figure 37 shows that the emerging 
economies accumulate debts while the developed economies either have decreasing debts or no 
debt at the high equilibrium. The accumulation of debts is one of the key reasons why the emerging 
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economies are more susceptible to financial crisis compared to the developed economies. High 
debt is a common phenomenon in the emerging economies, for example, the five Asian countries 
accumulated very high debts and foreign debts before the Asia ‘97 crisis as shown in Table 3 and 
Table 4. 
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Figure 39 to Figure 42 show the plots of aggregate debt against output growth rate for various 
wage premiums. Although it generally increases with output growth rate, the aggregate debt may 
remain constant or even decrease with output growth rate. In the other words, there is a positive 
relationship between aggregate debt and growth rate of the economy, in general, without ruling 
out the possibility of a negative relationship. 
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4.10.1 Capital  Inflow 
At the initial states of big-push, the growing investment activity increases the demand for 
investment fund increases.  If the domestic economy is not capable of supplying its own 
investment funds or its cost of capital is higher than that of the foreign economies, then the firms 
will borrow from foreign economies, resulting in a capital flow into the domestic economy. 
Without government’s control of capital inflow, big-push inevitably triggers a huge increase in 
capital inflow at the initial states. If all the technology-firms borrow from foreign banks, then the 
capital inflow of the economy at each period is just the difference between the debt of current 
period and that of the previous period: 
    1 − − = t t t B B CI (38) 
 
Figure 43 and Figure 44 shows the plots of capital inflow against time and industrialization state 
respectively. In Figure 43, for v , the capital inflow displays a sine wave curve where there 
is a positive capital inflow at the earlier periods and then negative capital inflow or capital 
outflow at later periods; and it eventually settles at zero when the debt is cleared. Apparently, for 
, the economy could not afford the debt and hence there is a continuous capital inflow to 
sustain debt as the economy heads toward an economic calamity. The higher is the wage 
premium, the higher is the capital inflow. In Figure 44, while the capital outflow starts at about 
 for  , capital outflow only starts when the economy is near to full 
industrialization for 
5 . 0 =
9 . 0 = v
6 . 0 = t n 3 . 0 = v
5 . 0 = v , because the path to full industrialization is faster with a higher wage 
premium. 
 
Although the government wants the economy to reach high equilibrium quickly so as to reduce 
the burden of unemployment, the high capital inflow shows up as large current account deficit 
which is usually perceived as a negative economic indicator. The increasing debt and capital 
inflow are familiar economic phenomena in emerging economies. Before the 1997 currency 
crisis, countries in South East Asia had high debt and high capital inflow while the economies 
were enjoying high growth. 
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June 1994 Dec 1996 June 1994 Dec 1996
Asia Average 37.2 30.1 12.8 12.2
China 29.5 32.3 1.9 4.9
Indonesia 54.0 39.7 7.7 9.5
Korea 29.4 24.3 10.0 9.4
Malaysia 40.2 36.9 11.3 10.5
Philippines 17.2 11.7 39.4 29.4
Thailand 56.8 53.5 7.1 7.2
Latin America Average 7.1 5.2 28.8 26.3
Argentina 5.3 4.0 31.2 29.5
Brazil 10.6 7.6 22.7 27.1
Chile 8.8 5.2 31.2 27.9
Colombia 13.0 7.8 26.6 24.6
Mexico 7.3 8.7 34.2 28.4
Peru 7.5 2.9 15.9 17.4
Uruguay 0.7 0.8 35.2 30.2
Venezuela 3.7 4.2 33.3 25.6
Sources:  Bank of International Settlements 





If the emerging economies are in the middle states of industrialization, then the developed 
economies are at the industrialization states near to the high equilibrium or even trapped at high 
equilibrium, such as the stagnation of the Japanese economy in 1990s. The emerging economies 
need a high capital inflow to meet the high demand for investment funds that are typically 
supplied by the high capital outflow of the industrialized economies.  For example, most of the 
Asian countries depend heavily on Japanese commercial bank lending while Latin American 
countries obtain the lion’s share of their commercial bank credit from U.S. banks, as shown in 
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Table 5. On the eve of the Thai crisis, 54% of Thai liabilities were to Japanese banks (Kaminsky 
and Reinhart 2000).  
 
Furthermore, there are studies of common lender effect, which describes how contagion can 
occur across several emerging markets that are exposed to a common group of investors or 
lenders, as a channel of contagion on financial crises. Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) and 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) present empirical evidence in support of the view that spillovers 
through common lenders or financial linkages were important channels of contagion for the 
Mexican, Thai and Russian currency crises. 
 
Finally, a number of literatures attribute the rapid pulling out of funds during crises as a major 
reason for perpetuating the financial crises. In the Asian crises, Japanese banks began to call 
loans from all the affected countries except Hong Kong. Likewise, U.S. banks pulled out from 
Latin America at the time of the debt crisis (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 2000). Corsetti et al. (1998) 
and Chang and Valesco (1998) provide an explanation that in the 1980s and 1990s, the Japanese 
financial institutions lent heavily outside Japan, especially to Asia, to seek higher returns for 
investment funds due to the stagnation of the Japanese economy. One of the reasons contributing 
to Asian crisis was the fact that the Japanese financial institutions called the funds back to 
rebalance portfolios because of the new capital adequacy requirement in 1997. 
 
4.10.11 Summary 
The economic characteristics of big-push are common observable economic phenomena in the 
emerging economies. High GDP growth is one of the key features due to the progressive 
“synchronization” of industrialization across sectors. These economic characteristics display 
dynamic behaviours, which are contingent on the ratio of wage premium on production and the 
industrialization state of an economy. Drawing parallels from the historical data of the emerging 
economies not only provides preliminary evidences, it provides justification for future research 
in taking up the challenge of calibrating and validating this model. 
 
One of the key reasons why emerging economies are more susceptible to financial crises is 
because emerging economies are in the middle of industrialization states where disequilibrium, 
in term of fragility, is at its peak. While they are enjoying high growth in production and 
consumption, the emerging economies have to confront the economic fragility induced by the 
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disequilibrium factors, especially the debts. On the other hand, the developed economies are less 
susceptible to financial crises because they are near to the high equilibrium, where the fragility of 
big-push is at its minimum. 
 
5. The  Implications 
 
This model provides a simple economic framework, within which economic relationships can be 
readily derived, for examples, the economic relationships between change in unemployment and 
output growth (the Okun’s Law) and between income inequality and output growth (the Kuznets 
Curve). Within this simple economic structure, all economic relationships are dynamic and 
contingent on the state of the economy, which is determined by the ratio of wage premium on 
productivity and the industrialization state. 
 
In Section 5.1, the similarity of the Japanese GNP growth curve and the S-shaped output growth 
curve of this model offers a plausible conclusion that the Japanese economy has reached its high 
equilibrium in 1990s, way after Meiji government made a big-push into industrialization during 
the late 1800, to explain the stagnation of the Japanese economy in 1990s. In addition, this model 
offers plausible explanations to the empirical deviations of the Okun’s Law or the Kuznets 
Curves as identified in the recent literature, in Section 5.2 and 5.3 respectively. 
 
5.1  The Stagnation of Japanese Economy 
The GNP plot of Japan from 1885-2000 as shown in Figure 45 displays a familiar S-shaped 
growth curve, which is similar to the S-shaped curve of the aggregate output simulated by this 
model, as shown in Figure 13. Since firms are not homogenous in reality, the similarity in S-
shaped curve may confirm the following two things: 
i.  The ratio of wage premium to productivity, θ , must be roughly constant. This implies that 
the existence of a productivity-linked wage system, which is a common policy practiced 
by both company and government. 
ii.  The economic development progresses according to this model. 
 
The Meiji government built Japan’s modern infrastructure and actively introduced foreign 
technology in a variety of industrial sectors and in agriculture (Ito, 1992). Figure 45 shows slow 
but steady growth of the Japanese Economy from the Meiji period to World War II. The 
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discontinuity of the GNP line shows the interruption of World War II when there was a sharp 
drop in productive capacity. Between 1950 and 1973, the Japanese economy grew at a 
remarkable growth rate, an average rate of ten percent a year (Ito, 1992). Then, the Japanese 




Source: (See Hayashi and Prescott, 2003) 
 
Several hypotheses have emerged in the literature to explain the stagnation of the Japanese 
economy in the 1990s. According to Krugman (1998), Japan was in a “liquidity trap”
18 such that 
the monetary policy was impotent to stimulate demand and raise spending since the Japanese 
interest rates were already near to zero. Dismissing the liquidity trap hypothesis, Hutchinson 
(2000) supports the credit crunch hypothesis which is an alternative explanation for the 
ineffectiveness of monetary policy to stimulate the Japanese economy. This explanation focuses 
on the contraction of the supply of bank credit caused by massive nonperforming loans 
accumulating in the financial system.  
 
Bernanke and Lown (1991), Montonishi and Yoshikawa (1999) and Woo (1999) attributed the 
stagnation to a credit crunch. Kwon (1998) and Bayoumi (1999) concluded that fluctuations in 
asset prices affected output through bank lending. Ogawa and Suzuki (1998) found evidence 
from panel data on large Japanese firms that the price of land as collateral affected investment 
demands. Sasaki (2000) states that lending by “city” banks (large Japanese banks) was 
constrained by the BIS capital-ratio requirement. Ogawa and Kitasaka (1998) assert that the 
decline in asset prices shifted both the demand and supply curves bank loans, which resulted in a 
                                                 
18 Keynes (1936) formulated the liquidity trap hypothesis, which suggests that at low levels of the rate of interest the 
demand for money could become highly, or even perfectly, elastic with respect to the interest rate. As a result, the 
monetary policy is impotent because any increase in the money supply will be hoarded. 
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fall in investment without a noticeable change in lending rates. Lastly, Hayashi and Prescott 
(2002) attribute the stagnation to a low productivity growth rate. 
 
In contrast to those partial models, this model provides a more cogent and complete explanation 
for the stagnation of the Japanese economy in 1990s. The Japanese economy has apparently 
attained the high equilibrium. To achieve an even higher equilibrium, the Japanese economy 
needs to go through another big-push.
19 Alternatively, Japan can grow its economy through 
natural growth such as population growth or some other ways such as introduction of new 
products. 
 
5.2  The Okun’s Law 
The relationship between unemployment rate and GDP growth is often formally summarized by 
the statistical relationship known as ‘Okun’s Law’. As developed by the late economist Arthur 
Okun (1962), the law relates decreases in the unemployment rate to increases in output growth. 
The Okun coefficient on unemployment is the coefficient of the regression (β ) where the GNP 
growth rate is regressed on the change in unemployment rate, as shown in the regression 
equation:  U a Y ∆ − = ∆ β % . The negative correlation between changes in the unemployment rate 
and changes in GDP growth is viewed as one of the most consistent relationship in 
macroeconomics. The Okun’s law is an important concept in macroeconomics both theoretically 
and empirically. Theoretically, Okun’s law is the link between the aggregate supply curve and 
the Phillips curve. Empirically, the Okun coefficient is a useful ‘rule of thumb’ in forecasting 
and policy making as the federal government of U.S. used the change in employment rate to 
forecast the GDP growth (Harris and Silverstone, 2001). 
 
In his original research based on the U.S. data, Okun (1962) found that a one-percentage point 
decline in the unemployment rate was, on average, associated with additional output growth of 
about two-percentage points. The basic economic theory behind the Okun’s Law is that changes 
in the unemployment rate influence other factors that affect output growth, although the output 
of an economy does not depend directly on the unemployment rate. Altig et al. (1997) plotted the 
current version of Okun’s Law as shown in Figure 46. The line indicates that the percentage 
change in output is roughly 3.2 minus two times the change in the unemployment rate, 
                                                 
19 Perhaps, there is a long-term upper limit to resources consumption and utilization, which is the environmental 
sustainable equilibrium on the Earth. 
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( ). The intercept value of 3.2 percent is interpreted as “potential GDP growth” 
or “natural” (long-run) growth rate of the economy in the Okun’s Law formulation. 
U Y ∆ − = ∆ 2 2 . 3 %
 
Figure 46 Unemployment and Output Growth (1960-1996) 
 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of 
Economic Analysis; U.S. Department of Labour, 
Bureau of Labour Statistics (See Altig et al., 1997) 
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Based on this model, Figure 47 to Figure 50 show the plots of output growth against the change 
in unemployment rate for various wage premiums. The plots, which display circular loops, 
demonstrate that the relationship between output growth and the change in unemployment rate is 
in general positive but can be negative depending on the industrialization state. The plots seem to 
contradict a general view of the Okun’s Law. However, by focusing around the equilibrium state 
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Figure 52 
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Assuming that U.S. economy has attained full industrialization status and stays around the 
equilibrium from 1960 to 1996, Figure 51 shows the simulated Okun’s Law for the U.S. 
economy using this model with  3 = α  and  8 . 1 = v . Focusing on data around the full 
industrialization or equilibrium state (near the origin), Figure 52 illustrates the simulated Okun’s 
Law for the the U.S. economy, which has Okun coefficient on unemployment of two but the 
intercept is zero. This means that the natural growth rate of this model is zero, which can 
reasonably be interpreted as output growth not due to big-push process but some other ways of 
growth, such as population growth.  
 
Okun’s Law has been examined by a number of economists, including Smith (1975), Gordon 
(1984), Prachowny (1993) and Weber (1995) for U.S.; and Knoester (1986), Kaufman (1988), 
Hamada and Kurosaka (1984) for Japan and other OECD countries. Although the results 
generally support the empirical validity of the relationship in the sense of finding a significantly 
negative coefficient on cyclical output, the magnitude of the coefficient is highly sensitive due to 
the three major weaknesses in the Okun’s Law: (1) the lack of dynamics within the joint 
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bivariate process, (2) the statistical properties of the data, and (3) the non-stability of the 
unemployment/economy activity relationship (Candelon and Hecq, 1998).  
 
Cuaresma (2003) concluded that changes in output can cause asymmetric changes in the 
unemployment rate; and Harris and Silverstone (2001) found that failure to take account of 
asymmetries would see a rejection of the hypothesis. There seems to be a consensus view that 
the relationship changed in the aftermath of the two oil shocks of 1973 and 1979 (Kaufman, 
1988, pp. 187). As stated in Altig et al. (1997) and even in economic textbook by Blanchard 
(1999, pp. 170), the stability of the Okun coefficient has decreased or shifted over time. 
 
Significant cross-country differences have been found, with larger coefficients on cyclical output 
obtained for the U.S. and Canada than for Europe and Japan (Kaufman, 1988; Moosa, 1997). 
Similarly, Sogner and Stiassny (2000) concluded that the reaction of the unemployment to 




Source: Figure 2, Barreto and Howland (1993) 
 
The measure of Japan’s Okun coefficient is quite controversial. Hamada and Kurosaka (1984), 
Mairesse (1984), Haraf (1984), Kaufman (1988) and Tachibanaki and Sakurai (1991) have all 
found extremely large Okun coefficients on unemployment for the Japanese economy. Barreto 
and Howland (1993) pointed out the problem of severely overestimating the Japan’s Okun 
coefficient on unemployment using the reciprocal of the coefficient from the wrong regression 
(regression of change of unemployment rate on GDP growth). They concurred, however, that the 
Okun coefficient for the Japanese economy is still undoubtedly larger than that for the U.S. 
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economy. Figure 53 shows the Okun’s Law for Japanese economy from 1953 to 1982 using the 
two different regression approaches. 
 
As shown in Figure 45, the Japanese economy was on its way to high equilibrium from 1953 to 
1982. Using this model with  3 = α  and  48 . 1 = v , Figure 54 shows the simulated Okun’s Law for 
the Japanese economy. Focusing on industrialization states near the equilibrium, Figure 55 
illustrates a simulated Okun’s Law for Japanese economy, which has an Okun coefficient on 
unemployment of about nine. 
 
Figure 54 – Okun’s Law (Japan) 
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Figure 55– Okun’s Law (Japan) 
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Zou and Hu (2003) pointed out that there is a significant deviation from the Okun’s Law for the 
Chinese economy. In view of limited research on the Okun’s Law for emerging economies, the 
Okun’s Law may only prevail when an economy is at equilibrium. On the other hand, this model 
may provide a more cogent and comprehensive economic model for understanding the 
relationship between output growth and unemployment rate. Combining the three equations, 
Equation (5a), (22a) and (26) provide a unique and nonlinear relationship between change in 
unemployment rate and output growth, which depends only on three variables: industrialization 
state, wage premium and productivity. In summary, this model proposes a dynamic non-linear 
“loop” economic relationship, which depends on the ratio of wage premium on productivity and 




                                                 
20 The “loop” is referred to the shape of the relationship as shown in Fi  to  .  gure 47 Figure 50
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5.3  The Kuznets Curve 
The Kuznets Curve is accepted as a strong empirical regularity (Ahluwalia, 1976a & 1976b; 
Barro, 2000) and the Kuznets relation is statistically significant (Papanek and Kyn, 1986). As 
discussed in Section 4.9.3, this model exhibits inverted-U curve which are similar to the Kuznets 
Curve. 
 
Figure 56 to Figure 59 show the plots of Gini Coefficient against output growth for different 
wage premiums. Although the relationship between inequality and growth is generally positive, 
Figure 59 shows that the relationship can behave like a circular loop, where a positive and a 
negative relationship between growth and inequality coexist. High growth is associated with both 
high and low inequality depending on the low or high industrialization state respectively. 
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In the Kuznets relation, the income inequality and output growth follows a positive linear 
relationship, assuming the growth path progresses linearly. This model shows that the 
relationship between inequality and growth may be complex and varies with the ratio of wage 
premium on productivity and the industrialization state of an economy, as shown in Figure 56 to 
Figure 59. The key reason is that the dynamic path of big-push is an S-shaped curve rather than a 
positive linear line.  
 
Although the Kuznets Curve has been one of the stylised facts of the study of income 
distribution for nearly four decades, some recent works have refuted it. Deininger and Squire 
(1996) conclude: “there appears to be little systematic relationship between growth and changes 
in aggregate inequality” and Deininger and Squire (1998) conclude: “our data provide little 
support for an inverted-U relationship between levels of income and inequality”. Anad and 
Kanbur (1993) claim the relationship has weakened over time. Some empirical works show that 
inequality is in fact negatively correlated with growth (Clarke, 1992; Ravallion and Chen 1997). 
Li, Squire and Zou (1998) argue that the Kuznets Curve works better for a cross section of 
countries at a point in time than for the evolution of inequality over time within countries. More 
recently models that feature a Kuznets Curve are models which involve a shift from a financially 
unsophisticated financial environment to a modern financial system (Greenwood and Jovanovic, 
1990) or model a shift from an old technology to a more advanced technology (Aghion and 
Howitt, 1997; Galor and Tsiddon, 1997; Helpman, 1997). 
 
Perhaps, this model can provide a more cogent and comprehensive theory for understanding the 
relationship between income inequality and output growth beyond the Kuznets relation. This 
model proposes a dynamic non-linear “loop” economic relationship, which is contingent on the 
ratio of wage premium on productivity and the industrialization state of an economy, between 




In this paper, a new growth model driven by two key parameters: the wage premium and the 
productivity, is constructed based on the theory of big-push. This model is a multi-equilibrium 
model and has low and high steady states, corresponding to the no-industrialization and full-
industrialization state. Capturing the true essence of big-push, this model involves a kick-start in 
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order to initiate a big-push process. Beside the typical S-shaped dynamic path, this model can 
exhibits chaotic behaviours if the ratio of wage premium on productivity is higher than a certain 
value. 
 
Within the simple economic structure of this model, the economic characteristics of big-push 
display dynamic behaviours which are common observable economic phenomena in the 
emerging economies. One of the key economic features of big-push is a high economic growth 
due to the progressive “synchronization” of industrialization across sectors. Drawing parallels 
from the historical data not only provides preliminary evidences, it provides justification and 
motivation for future research to take up the challenge of calibrating and validating of this 
model. 
 
In this model, the characteristics of disequilibrium growth introduce fragility into the emerging 
economies. One of the key reasons why emerging economies are more susceptible to financial 
crises is because emerging economies are in the middle of industrialization states where 
disequilibrium, in term of fragility, is at its peak. Leow (2004) extends this model to simulate the 
Sudden-stop phenomenon of financial crisis as advocated by Calvo (1998). 
 
After the Meiji government made a big-push into industrialization in late 1800, the fact that the 
Japanese economy has already attained its high equilibrium offers a simple yet plausible 
explanation to the stagnation of the Japanese economy in the 1900s. In providing plausible 
theoretical reasons for the empirical deviations of Okun’s Law and Kuznets Curve as identified 
in the recent literature, this model proposes a hypothesis that there is a dynamic non-linear 
“loop” economic relationship, which is contingent on the state of a economy determined by the 
ratio of wage premium on productivity and the industrialization state, between output growth and 
income inequality and between output growth and change in unemployment rate. The validation 
of these “loop” relationships will be another challenge for future research. 
 
In general, this model may have a significant implication for economic theories that economic 
relationships may not be static but dynamic and contingent on the state of an economy, which is 
determined by the ratio of wage premium on productivity and the industrialization state. 
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Table of Symbols 
 
Subscripts   
t Ci Y ,   The output of a cottage-firm at time t 
t C Y ,   The aggregate output of cottage-firms at time t 
t Ti Y ,   The output of a technology-firm at time    t
t T Y ,   The aggregate output of technology-firms at time    t
t Y   The aggregate output of the group-economy at time    t
Parameters   
α   Production productivity 
β   Okun coefficient 
γ   Proportionate gain in productivity  α α / ) 1 ( −  
ε   Employment rate 
v  Wage premium 
θ   Ratio of wage premium on productivity ( α / v ) 
τ   The time at which the economy attains high equilibrium (  at  1 = n τ = t ) 
Π  Operating profit 
ℑ  Present value of operating profits (financing capability of a technology-firm) 
i,  j   Count 
n  Industrialization state 
(Low equilibrium state:  0 = n , High equilibrium state:  )  1 = n
r   Interest rate 
s,    t Time 
1 t   Time at which a technology-firm takes up a bank loan to invest in IRS 
technology. 
2 t   Time at which a technology-firm clears its debt.  
w  Wage rate 
U w   Employment benefit (dole) 
B   Debt 
C   Consumption 
C ∇   Extra consumption 
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D  Spillover demand (Q Y − ) 
E   Employment 
F   Period debt repayment 
G   Surplus inventory 
L  Labour endowment (numeraire) 
N   Number of complementary firms 
Q  Demand 
S   Period Savings 
U   Unemployment rate 
U ∆   Change in unemployment rate 
V   Average of the product of employment rate and wage premium 
W   Labour cost 
W ∇   Extra Disposable Income 
Y   Output 
Y ∇   Extra output (Y C T Y − ) 
Z   Investment failure function 
CI   Capital inflow 
GC   Gini coefficient 
C ∆ %   Consumption growth rate 
W ∆ %   Income growth rate 
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